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CIVIL PROCEDURE

Truman v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 375 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va.

1988).
The plaintiff, formerly employed by the defendant as a bank
teller, brought an action against the defendant for wrongful discharge and for defamation. The plaintiff suspected that she had been
fired for reasons other than those given by the defendant. The
defendant did not respond to her interrogatories and requests for
production of documents. The plaintiff moved to compel discovery;
the defendant moved for a protective order and then for summary
judgment. Without resolving the conflicting motions on discovery,
the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
The Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had
erred in granting a motion for summary judgment. The court determined that when summary judgment was granted, there were material facts in dispute. Among the disputed facts were: whether the
plaintiff had violated bank policies, whether false accusations of
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theft had been made against her, whether those false accusations
had been communicated by the bank to third parties, and what
reasons actually convinced the bank to discharge her. By failing to
rule on the merits of the motion to compel discovery, the trial court
may have foreclosed the plaintiff from developing her case so as to
resist the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Supreme Court of Appeals held that when, as here, facts
relevant to the motion for summary judgment need to be developed
by further discovery, the trial court should not grant the motion.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it
is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry
concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the
law.
Midkiff v. Kenney, 375 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1988).
The plaintiffs, purchasers of a home, brought an action alleging
faulty construction against the defendants, one of whom was both
the builder and vendor. An order reflecting the trial date was mailed
to counsel for the defendants, but never received by them. As a
result, neither the defendants nor their counsel appeared for trial.
A default judgment was entered by the circuit court and a jury
awarded damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants then filed a motion to have the default judgment set aside. The circuit court, however, refused to grant this motion.
The defendants appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred
in refusing to set aside the default judgment for good cause. The
Supreme Court of Appeals stated that it has consistently encouraged
hearings on the merits. It has given a liberal construction to Rules
55(c) and 60(b), West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow
a default judgment to be set aside. Nevertheless, a lower court's
decision to enter judgment by default will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there is a showing that the court abused its sound discretion.
In the instant case, the defendants filed a notice of bona fide
defense, answered the complaint, and participated in discovery. These
actions clearly indicate that if the defendants had received notice,
they would have attended and participated in trial. Therefore, the
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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Supreme Court of Appeals held that the circuit court had abused
its discretion. The default judgment was set aside.
Dawson v. Woodson, 376 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1988).
The appellee owned a horse that jumped a fence and collided
with the appellant's passing car. The Jefferson County Circuit Court
granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment based on the
appellee's argument that he was not liable for personal injury damages under W. Va. Code § 19-18-1-5 (1988) (hereinafter 19-18-1-5).
Since the statute, which applies to property damage caused by an
animal, contains no provision for a damage award for personal injuries, the trial court determined the appellee was not liable for the
personal injuries suffered by the appellant in the accident.
The appellee argues that absent evidence at trial that he was
negligent, the appellant's claim for negligent care of the horse would
be precluded by § 19-18-1-5. Because the appellant stipulated prior
to the trial that specific acts of the appellee's negligence would not
be produced, the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment
to the appellee on the issue of liability was correct.
The Supreme Court disagreed and held that despite the appellee's
stipulation that precluded proof of negligence, there were issues of
material fact relating to the appellee's negligence raised in the appellant's amended complaint that should be heard and decided by
a jury. Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that an injured
party may maintain a common law action for damages if the owner
of an animal causing an accident failed to exercise ordinary care to
prevent the animal from injuring others. Since animal owners have
a fundamental duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent their animals
from causing injuries, an injured party may maintain an action for
personal injury even though § 19-18-1-5 does not provide a statutory
right to damages for personal injury.
Thus, while § 19-18-1-5 does not provide damages for personal
injuries occurring under circumstances such as those in this case,
the injured party may maintain a common law action for damages
under a negligence theory if the defendant failed to exercise ordinary
care in preventing injury to others. For this reason, the decision of
the circuit court was reversed and the case was remanded.
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
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Bennett v. Warner, 372 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1988).
The appellants appealed an adverse ruling of the Circuit Court
of Pendleton County relating to a right-of-way dispute. The appellants sought damages under the tort of "outrage" from the appellee, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (hereinafter
Commonwealth), for its failure to correct a title deficiency relating
to the disputed right-of-way.
The Supreme Court addressed the following issues: (1) whether
W. Va. Code § 52-1-1 was mandatory in its requirement that jury
qualification forms be used, (2) whether the circuit court was correct
in bifurcating the liability phase of the trial from the damages phase,
and (3) the inability of the appellants to depose Commonwealth's
attorney because of a court imposed blanket protective order. The
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision on all three issues
raised by the appellants on appeal.
First, the court held that the 1986 jury selection statute, W. Va.
Code § 52-1-1, required the use of jury qualification forms, and the
circuit court's failure to require their use warranted a new trial (however, prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in this case, the
legislature nullified the mandated use of jury qualification forms as
of July 1, 1988, and left their use to the discretion of the trial judge).
Second, the court granted a new trial on the issue of the circuit
court's sua sponte bifurcation of the liability phase and the damage
phase of the trial. The court interpreted Rule 42(c) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure as providing that a trial court may
grant a separate trial on any issue when two trials: (1) furthers convenience, (2) avoids prejudice, or (3) is conducive to expedition and
judicial economy. However, the trial court in this case did not provide sufficient justification that bifurcation would promote the above
recognized goals, which are designed to provide a fair and impartial
trial. Since bifurcation in this case would require substantial overlap
of witnesses and testimony, two problems that Rule 42(c) is designed
to prevent, the trial court erred in bifurcating the trial.
Rule 26(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure was
the basis of the court's grant of a new trial on the issue of the trial
court's blanket protective order granted to an attorney who had
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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previously represented the appellee in this case. The protective order
precluded the appellants from taking the attorney's deposition in
this case. The court determined that the trial court's failure to give
full consideration to a more narrowly drawn protective order was
an abuse of its discretion under Rule 26(c). The broad protective
order granted by the trial court ignored the fact finding function
of the proposed deposition as well as its importance in the discovery
function.
II.

COMMERCIAL LAW

Stark v. Huntington Housing Auth., 375 S.E.2d 772 (W. Va. 1988).
The defendant, Huntington Housing Authority (HHA), sent out
invitations to bid on a project for renovation of the electrical system
in a low-income housing project. The appellant's bid was accepted
by HHA subject to approval by the federal Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). HUD refused their approval, and
HHA then awarded the contract to another bidder.
The appellant contended that a binding contract had been formed
by the defendant's acceptance of their bid and that the defendant
was bound by its invitation to bid, which said nothing about requiring HUD's approval. The Supreme Court of Appeals noted that
this argument ignores basic contract law. The court held that HHA's
invitation to bid was not an offer. The appellant, by returning its
bid, made an offer to perform the work. HHA was not obligated
to accept appellant's offer. HHA's solicitation of bids explicitly reserved the right to reject any or all bids. In addition, the court noted
that HHA is an agency of the City of Huntington, and W. Va.
Code § 5-22-1 (1983) provides that the State and its subdivisions
may reject any and all bids.
Alternatively, the court stated that HHA's acceptance of appellant's bid, by imposing the condition of HUD's approval, could
be seen as an acceptance on terms varying from those offered by
appellant. An acceptance which varies materially from an offer is
a counter-offer. Bowers Co. v. Kanawha Valley Prod. Co., 100 W.
Va. 278, 130 S.E. 284 (1925) (syllabus point 2). A counter-offer is
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dition was not met because HUD did not approve. By any
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Kesner v. Lancaster, 378 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1989).

Kesner, the buyer of a tractor-loader purchased at the seller's
home, discovered substantial defects in the machine after the sale.
He then sought to revoke his acceptance and recover the purchase
price of the loader under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), W. Va. Code § 46-2-608. The jury returned a verdict
for the buyer, and the seller appealed. The seller first argued that
the UCC does not apply to transactions in which neither party is
a merchant. Seller then argued that the buyer failed to show prima
facie evidence that the defect was difficult to discover or that the
machine was substantially impaired.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict for the buyer.
The court held that all of the provisions of the UCC which are not
expressly limited to merchants apply to any sale of goods. Therefore,
although this transaction was an isolated sale in which neither party
was a merchant, it was still subject to the revocation provisions of
the UCC, W. Va. Code § 46-2-608.
The revocation provisions of the UCC specify four conditions
which a buyer must meet in order to revoke his acceptance of goods
for nonconformity to the contract of sale: (1) the buyer must notify
the seller of his revocation; (2) notification must be given within a
reasonable time after discovery of the defect and before any substantial change in the condition of the goods; (3) the nonconformity
must substantially impair the value of the merchandise to the buyer;
(4) the buyer must accept the merchandise without discovering its
defects, either because of the difficulty of discovery or because of
the seller's assurances. Only the last two conditions were contested
on appeal. The court held that there was prima facie evidence for
the jury to find that these two conditions had been met.
Substantial impairment of the value of goods must meet both a
subjective test and an objective test. From a subjective standpoint,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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because the loader did not conform to the contract of sale, it could
not do the work for which the buyer purchased it. Due to nonconformity to the contract, the merchandise did not meet the buyer's
needs and expectations. From an objective standpoint, substantial
repairs were necessary to correct actual defects that were not trivial.
The buyer, who was a layman, satisfied the "difficulty of discovery" test because he made a reasonable inspection of the machine
at the time of sale, and these defects were not then apparent. Only
after the machine malfunctioned and the buyer had removed the
seats, floorboard and belly pan did he discover the defective parts.
III.

CRuMINAL LAW/PROCEDURE

State v. Jenkins, 379 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1989).
The appellant, a mildly retarded defendant with an IQ of approximately 65, was convicted of sexual abuse. The appellant contended that the trial court had erred in finding him competent to
stand trial. The appellant had been examined by three experts, a
psychiatrist and two psychologists. All three experts agreed that the
appellant was mildly to moderately retarded. Two of the experts,
the psychiatrist and one psychologist, concluded that the appellant
was competent to stand trial: he could understand the charges and
the nature of the proceedings against him well enough that he could
assist his counsel at trial. The third expert, however, testified that
the appellant was not competent to stand trial. That expert did admit, however, that the appellant had correctly answered most questions about the roles of judge, jury, prosecuting attorney and defense
attorney. The third expert also felt that the appellant was able to
inform his counsel of facts surrounding the incident in question.
The Supreme Court of Appeals stated the established rule that
no person may be subjected to trial on a criminal charge when, by
virtue of mental incapacity, that person is unable to consult with
his attorney and to assist in his own defense with a reasonable understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings against him.
State v. Barrow, 359 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1987) (syllabus point 6).
The trial judge, acting as the finder of fact during the competency hearing, found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
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accused, despite mild mental retardation, was competent to stand
trial. The Supreme Court of Appeals agreed, noting that it would
reverse a trial court's finding of fact only if that finding were contrary to a preponderance of the evidence.
State v. Molisee, 378 S.E.2d 100 (W, Va. 1989).
A magistrate court had found the appellant's dog to be a vicious
animal and ordered it euthanized. The appellant, pro se, appealed
the decision to the circuit court. The case was first docketed before
a circuit judge. Then, in response to the appellant's request, it was
rescheduled for a trial by jury. The new trial was docketed one
month earlier than the originally scheduled bench trial. The appellant
failed to appear, and the trial judge reinstated the magistrate's order.
On appeal, appellant contended that she did not receive any notice whatsoever of her new trial date and was therefore deprived of
an opportunity to be heard. The State produced no evidence that
notice was actually sent to the appellant. The Supreme Court of
Appeals noted that it has emphasized the importance of adequate
notice to pro se litigants who prosecute appeals from magistrate
court. The court held that failure to provide effective notice of the
time and place of trial is a violation of fundamental due process
rights guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the
West Virginia Constitution. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and remanded the
case for trial.
State v. Hanna, 378 S.E.2d 640 (W. Va. 1989).
The defendant, who was angry because his ex-girlfriend had begun dating someone else, kicked in the locked front door of her
new boyfriend's house and demanded to speak to her. After an
argument involving all three persons, the defendant's ex-girlfriend
left the room. The defendant, who had threatened to kill both of
them, pointed a pistol at the new boyfriend and insisted that the
ex-girlfriend return. She did, and she and the defendant left the
house without further discussion. She has not been seen or heard
from since, and efforts by the police to locate her have been unsuccessful. As a result, the defendant was convicted of the crimes
of kidnapping,, abduction with intent to defile, and burglary.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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The defendant appealed his conviction for kidnapping and abduction with intent to defile on the following grounds: 1) that the
trial court erred in overruling his objection to the use of cameras
in the courtroom during trial; 2) that the state failed to prove the
intent necessary for both the abduction and kidnapping charges; 3)
that the state failed to show that the defendant used force or compulsion to compel the victim to go with him; 4) that the trial court
erred in admitting into evidence past acts of violence by the defendant against the victim.
The trial court allowed the use of still photographic cameras in
the courtroom. During the trial, the defendant's counsel twice objected that noise made by the camera shutters was distracting. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that mere general allegations of prejudice are not sufficient. The defendant did not meet
the burden of showing with specificity how the noise impaired his
counsel's performance or how it adversely affected his constitutional
right to a fair trial.
With regard to abduction with intent to defile, the Supreme Court
of Appeals held that a specific purpose, the motivation to defile,
is an essential element of the offense. The court ruled that the State
did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the defendant's purpose. Therefore, the conviction for abduction with intent
to defile was reversed.
The court, however, held that State did present evidence of intent
and evidence of coercion sufficient to affirm the defendant's conviction for kidnapping. The specific intent necessary for the offense
of kidnapping is the intent to demand "any concession or advantage
of any sort." W. Va. Code § 61-2-14a (1984). The defendant forcibly
removed the victim from a friend's home in order to gain the opportunity to talk to her alone and attempt a reconciliation. That
opportunity, the court reasoned, was the concession or advantage
sought by the defendant. There was sufficient evidence to establish
the requisite specific intent.
The court then addressed the element of force or compulsion
with regard to the offense of kidnapping. The State is not required
to show that the accused used actual physical force or express threats.
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
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If the victim submits because of reasonable fear of harm or injury
from the accused, consent of the victim is not a defense. People v.
Stephenson, 10 Cal. 3d 652, 111 Cal. Rptr. 556, 517 P.2d 820 (1974);
Coleman v. State, 264 Ind. 64, 339 N.E.2d 51 (1975); State v. Holt,
223 Kan. 34, 574 P.2d 152 (1977). In its proof that the victim consented out of fear for her safety and the safety of her companion,
the State first introduced evidence that the defendant threatened
them both and pointed a gun at her. Then, in order to show that
the victim's fear was reasonable, the State introduced evidence of
past acts of violence by the defendant against the victim. The defendant claimed that admission of evidence that he had committed
other criminal acts or acts of misconduct against the victim in the
past was error. Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence
provides that evidence of other criminal acts or misconduct is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that
he acted in conformity therewith, but such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive. "Here" or
"in the instant case", lack of consent by the victim was an element
of the crime, and the defendant's prior conduct toward the victim
was clearly relevant to show that the victim's action was not consensual. The court held that it could not say that the probative value
of evidence as to the appellant's past violent behavior was outweighed by its possible prejudicial effect. Therefore, the court could
not reverse the lower court's ruling on this issue.
Wolfe v. Hedrick, No. 18261 (July 20, 1988).
The relator was convicted of kidnapping and armed robbery and
sentenced to life in the state penitentiary with a recommendation of
mercy. The relator, an indigent, requested that new counsel be appointed to represent him on appeal. Consequently, new counsel was
appointed. The new attorney requested transcripts of the trial, but
he did not receive them until nearly two years later. Review of the
transcripts then revealed only two issues for appeal. On those issues,
the Supreme Court of Appeals had refused an appellate petition
alleging identical errors brought by a co-indictee in the same case.
The second attorney so informed Wolfe. Subsequently, a third attorney was appointed and filed an appeal in his behalf. The relator
then filed this proceeding in habeas corpus claiming that the State
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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was guilty of extraordinary dereliction in failing to provide him with
an appeal and that he was therefore entitled to immediate release
from custody.
In determining the appropriate relief in habeas corpus when defense counsel has not prosecuted a timely appeal, the appropriate
remedy is not discharge but such remedial steps as will permit the
effective prosecution of an appeal. Carter v. Bordenkircher, 159 W.
Va. 717, 226 S.E.2d 711 (1976) (syllabus point 2). Carter,however,
does provide for discharge in the case of extraordinary dereliction
on the part of the State.
The Supreme Court of Appeals found that there was not such
extraordinary dereliction as to justify the relator's request for discharge from custody. The court reasoned that since the relator had
not yet served the minimum amount of time on his sentence, any
delay in filing an appeal was harmless. The relator did not show
that he suffered actual injury as a result of the delay. An appeal
had been filed and would be heard. That was the appropriate remedy. The writ of habeas corpus was discharged.
City of Fairmont v. Schumaker, 375 S.E.2d 785 (W. Va. 1988).
The defendant was charged with violating a Fairmont, West Virginia city ordinance, driving under the influence of alcohol. The
defendant requested a jury trial, which was granted by the municipal
court of Fairmont. However, rather than providing a jury trial in
municipal court, the municipal court judge removed the case to the
Marion County Circuit Court for the jury trial.
The defendant filed a motion in circuit court to have the case
remanded to municipal court for the jury trial. The circuit court
determined that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial in municipal court, but certified the question to the Supreme Court for
resolution.
The Supreme Court held that art. 3, section 4 of the West Virginia Constitution requires that an individual charged with a felony
or misdemeanor be provided a jury trial, if the defendant requests
it, when the offense involves a statutory possibility of incarceration.
Since Fairmont's driving under the influence statute provides for
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
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possible incarceration, the circuit court was correct in its decision.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the West Virginia Constitution entitled the defendant to a jury trial in municipal court,
rather than in circuit court.

IV.

EMPLOYMENT LAW

Mace v. Pizza Hut, 377 S.E.2d 461 (W. Va. 1988).
The West Virginia Human Rights Commission (Commission) dismissed the appellant's complaint alleging that her employer had fired
her in retaliation for her filing an age discrimination complaint. The
appellant contended that the Commission erred in ruling that she
had not made a prima facie showing of retaliatory conduct on the
part of the employer.
The court noted that whether the employer's intent was retaliatory was a question of fact. The court stated that it has long followed the principle that findings of fact by the Commission should
be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence or are
uncontested by the parties. The court will consider the record as a
whole, and findings of the Commission as to discriminatory intent
will not be reversed unless those findings are clearly wrong.
The court could not determine from the record whether the hearing examiner had been aware of some of the evidence which the
appellant submitted to the court. The court noted that it normally
limits its review of administrative decisions to the record made at
the agency's hearing. This issue was moot, however, because the
court found that even if the appellant had established prima facie

evidence of retaliatory discharge, there was credible evidence on the
record to support the employer's assertion of legitimate, nondiscriminatoiy reasons for its action. The appellant had not rebutted
this evidence. Thus, the court could not say that the Commission
was clearly wrong in determining that there was no showing of retaliatory action by the employer. The court affirmed the Commission's decision.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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St. John's Home v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 375
S.E.2d 769 (W. Va. 1988).
The petitioner, who was employed as a cook at a residential care
facility for emotionally disturbed children, expressed to the executive
director her interest in applying for a position as a boys' cottage
supervisor. The petitioner was told that a male was being sought
for the position. Females had previously held this position, but the
boys in residence had frequently assaulted female staff members.
Fights between the boys themselves had occurred frequently as well.
After a male supervisor was hired, these problems abated. Some
time later the petitioner was laid off from her position as cook, and
she filed a complaint with the West Virginia Human Rights Commission for sex discrimination.
Under the provisions of W. Va. Code § 5-11-9 (1981), it is an
unlawful discriminatory practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, to limit employment because of sex. The
Supreme Court of Appeals held that requiring a male for the position of house supervisor of a cottage for disturbed, aggressive teenage boys was a bona fide occupational qualification. The job required
close supervision of some residents who were potentially assaultive
or suicidal. This necessarily included supervision of the boys in
showers, lavatories and sleeping quarters. Previous female cottage
supervisors had often been physically attacked and sexually assaulted. The court held that a male cottage supervisor would be less
embarrassing to the boys in such settings, and that a male would
present less of a target for sexual assault.
This same issue was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53
L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). The U.S. Supreme Court held that being male
was a bona fide occupational qualification for prison guards in
"contact positions" at the state of Alabama's maximum security
male penitentiaries because those positions required closer physical
proximity to inmates.
Hazelock v. West Virginia Civil Service Comm'n and West Virginia
Dep't of Human Services, No. 18262 (Nov. 29, 1988).
The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel payment
of a 1987 Supreme Court order. In the petitioner's 1987 appeal, the
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
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Supreme Court reversed a ruling of the West Virginia Civil Service
Commission and ordered the petitioner reinstated to his previous
pay classification, from which he had been arbitrarily demoted, as
well as reimbursement for his attorney fees.
The question raised in the mandamus hearing was limited to
whether the West Virginia Civil Service Commission or the West
Virginia Department of Human Services, the petitioner's employer,
is responsible for payment of the petitioner's attorney fees resulting
from his 1987 legal action.
The court granted the writ of mandamus, holding that the petitioner established a clear legal right to the reasonable fees, and
the Department of Human Services, as the appointing authority, had
a legal duty to pay the fees. The Supreme Court reasoned that although the Civil Service Commission was ordered "to reimburse the
petitioner," in the 1987 litigation, it was referring to the adjudicatory authority of the West Virginia Civil Service Commission to
require the appointing authority, the Department of Human Services, to pay the attorney fees.
Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 371 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1988).
The appellant, who had been employed in a supervisory position
by Elkay Mining Company, a mining subcontractor for the co-defendant, Pittston Company, alleged that he was discharged from his
employment for refusing to falsify safety reports. The appellant argued that his discharge violated public policy designed to protect
employees from discharge for their safety related activities. Additionally, the appellant asserted that he had an implied employment
contract that Elkay breached when he was discharged. The Logan
County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the appellees.
The appellant's circuit court action was not ripe because he had not
pursued state and federal administrative remedies prior to his circuit
court action.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and
remanded the case for a new trial on both issues raised by the appellant. First, the court held that, the plaintiff was not required to
exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a tort action in
circuit court. The court reasoned that permitting an administrative
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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action and/or a civil action would enhance the substantial public
policy interests embodied in the Mine Safety Act. The tort remedies
available to the appellant included claims for intentional infliction
of severe emotional distress, and punitive damages, remedies that
are not available in administrative actions. Moreover, the administrative process has positive attributes that the court thought should
remain available to plaintiffs, including awards of back pay and
attorney's fees. The availability of either or both remedies and the
monetary damages accompanying each will insure that employers
follow the intent and letter of safety statutes. Therefore, the trial
court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of retaliatory discharge was reversed.
On the second issue, the court found that the appellant's cause
of action based upon Elkay's breach of an implied employment contract was recognized under West Virginia law. A verbal promise by
an employer, or language contained in an employment handbook
or a policy manual, that can be interpreted as an express or implied
promise of continuing employment may create an offer for an employment contract that an employee accepts by continuing to work
for the employer. In this case, the appellant alleged that he had
been induced to remain with his employer because the appellee
promised him financial security until retirement. Thus, the appellant's detriment on relying on the appellee's promise of job security,
and the defendant's benefit of employing the appellant could create
an employment contract. The issue of the possible existence of a
valid employment contract required that the case be remanded for
a new trial.
Helm v. Gatson, 378 S.E.2d 667 (W. Va. 1989).
The appellee was employed as a teller and sales representative
for the appellant bank. During her employment tenure, the appellee
received a written reprimand for being rude to customers and for
failure to follow bank procedures. On the second occasion of failure
to follow bank procedures, she was terminated. Subsequent to her
termination, the appellee applied for unemployment compensation.
The administrative law judge found that the appellee was not discharged for misconduct and granted her unemployment benefits.
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The appellant appealed the decision of the administrative law
judge and the decision was set aside by the Board of Review of the
West Virginia Department of Employment Security (hereinafter
Board). The appellee appealed the decision of the Board to the Kanawha County Circuit Court which reversed the Board's decision and
reinstated the appellee's unemployment benefits. The appellant then
appealed the ruling of the circuit court.
W. Va, Code § 21A-6-3(2) precludes unemployment compensation benefits for an employee discharged from employment for
gross misconduct. Gross misconduct may be found when an employee has committed an act of misconduct and received a written
warning that termination may result if the misconduct reoccurs.If
the misconduct reoccurs following the written warning, the employee
may be found to have engaged in gross misconduct, which precludes
the employee from being eligible for unemployment benefits.
In this case, the appellee had received a prior written warning
for the same offense that led to her termination. The Supreme Court
held that the appellee had been discharged for gross misconduct and
was not entitled to unemployment compensation. The court reasoned
that since the appellant's procedure manual clearly outlined the policy that the appellee violated, the appellee's failure to follow the
work rule was unreasonable. Additionally, the appellee's unreasonable violation was a second offense for which she had received a
prior written warning. Therefore, the appellee's conduct constituted
gross misconduct. In affirming the finding of the Board and reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court stated that in an unemployment case, the decision of the Board should not be set aside
unless clearly wrong.
Huntington Publishing Co. v. Caryl, 377 S.E.2d 479 (W. Va. 1988).
The West Virginia State Tax Commissioner (Commissioner) found
that the Huntington Publishing Company (Publisher) had not paid
business and occupation taxes on retail sales on its newspapers, and
assessed the Publisher for the delinquent taxes. The sales in question
were made by youth carriers who deliver the newspapers to the ultimate customer. The Publisher appealed the Commissioner's decision to the Kanawha County Circuit Court, The circuit court
reversed the administrative decision of the Commissioner.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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The Commissioner appealed the adverse decision of the Kanawha
County Circuit Court on the question of whether the newspaper
carrier's sales constituted retail sales under W. Va. Code § 11-132(c) (1971).
On appeal, the Publisher argued that the newspaper carriers are
independent contractors who purchase the newspapers at wholesale
and sell to retail customers, Thus, the newspaper carriers, rather
than the Publisher, are responsible for the business and occupation
taxes. The Publisher, in justifying the independent contractor status
of the carriers, argued that: (1) the carriers are not under the Publisher's control concerning method of delivery, (2) the carriers can
set the price they wish to charge for the newspapers, (3) the carriers
can hire assistants, and (4) the carriers have the option of packaging
the newspapers in the manner they prefer.
The Supreme Court determined that the newspaper carriers were
not independent contractors. The court reasoned that the Publisher
was involved in the carrier/customer relationship in several ways:
(1) the newspaper carriers had no real control over the price charged
for the papers, (2) the Publisher aided in the collection of delinquent
accounts, (3) poor performance by a carrier could have resulted in
his termination by a route manager, and (4) the Publisher provided
record keeping systems to the carriers. Therefore, the court concluded that the degree of control exercised by the Publisher over
the carriers supported a finding that the retail sales are actually
taking place between the Publisher and the customer.
Moreover, even if the carriers were independent contractors, they
could be considered agents of the Publisher for tax purposes. Consequently, the Publisher would be making retail sales through its
agents, the carriers, and the Publisher would still be liable for the
business and occupation taxes. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise and to allow contractual shifts in tax burdens would open a
stampede of tax avoidance.
The Supreme Court reversed the Kanawha County Circuit Court
and remanded the case with directions to enter the tax judgment
against the Publisher. The Supreme Court stated that the Publisher
cannot retain the amount of control exercised over the carriers and
assert that it is making wholesale sales to the carriers.
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Appalachian Regional Health Care v. West Virginia Human Rights
Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 1988).
The West Virginia Human Rights Commission (Commission) reopened a hearing sua sponte six years after it had originally dismissed the appellee's action. In the reopened hearing, the Commission
found that the appellee, a female doctor, had been the victim of
sex discrimination. Moreover, the Commission found that the appellee had been discharged from her employment with the appellant,
Beckley Appalachian Regional Hospital (Hospital) in retaliation for
filing the sex discrimination charge. In finding that the appellee's
rights had been violated, the Commission awarded her substantial
compensatory damages.
The issue in the case arises from the appellee's failure to request
the rehearing or to appeal the dismissal at the time the Commissioner
dismissed the original action. The appellant alleges the Commission
lacked jurisdiction to reopen the hearing sua sponte since it had
dismissed the charges and closed the case six years earlier.
The Supreme Court held that the Commission did not have statutory authority to sua sponte reopen a hearing. Furthermore, the
court determined that the appellee should not have been the beneficiary of the discrimination and retaliatory discharge award because she did not file an objection or appeal the Commission's
dismissal of her original claim. The court reasoned that to hold
otherwise would disrupt the orderly disposition of cases and the
parties' justified reliance that the case was closed.
V.

EVIDENCE

Reager v. Anderson, 371 S.E. 2d 619 (W. Va. 1988).
The appellant, one of two defendants below, claimed as error
that the jury verdict against him for medical malpractice was based
on insufficient evidence of liability and insufficient evidence as to
apportionment of liability. The Supreme Court of Appeals disagreed. The court ruled that questions of negligence, due care, proximate cause and concurrent negligence are issues of fact for jury
determination. Comparative negligence, which the court said should
more accurately be called comparative causation, is also a question
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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of fact for jury determination. The court stated that comparative
negligence should not be determined as a matter of law unless the
facts are undisputed and there is no genuine issue as to the conclusion to be drawn from the facts.
The appellant also claimed as error that the damages awarded
were excessive because evidence on the projected loss of future earnings was speculative and because expert testimony was admitted into
evidence regarding a novel prosthetic device which had not gained
general acceptance in the field of prosthetics. The court noted that
it would not set aside a jury verdict as excessive unless the verdict
were monstrous, outrageous and beyond all measure. The court then
held that the damages awarded were supported by the evidence of
permanent pain and suffering alone, without consideration of the
special damages. Even if the damages claimed as error were excluded, the amount of damages awarded was not unreasonable.
Therefore, the errors alleged did not affect the substantial rights of
the defendant and were harmless error under Rule 61 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
The appellant also asserted that he was prejudiced by the trial
court's refusal to disclose to the jury a "Mary Carter" agreement
between the plaintiffs and his co-defendant whereby the co-defendant agreed to pay $500,000 to the plaintiffs, subject to reimbursement from the plaintiffs of any judgement in excess of $1,000,000.
The co-defendant remained a party to the action, and the jury was
not told of the agreement.
The Supreme Court of Appeals held that disclosure to the jury
of the general nature of a "Mary Carter" agreement is not required
in each case. Disclosure lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court. In the instant case, the "Mary Carter" agreement was reached
after the evidence had been presented and before closing arguments.
Therefore, it could not have affected the presentation of evidence
or the examination of witnesses. In closing arguments, the plaintiffs
emphasized the fault of the appellant over the fault of the co-defendant, but the trial court decided that disclosure of the settlement
was nevertheless unnecessary. The Supreme Court of Appeals held
that the appellant failed to make a particularized showing of prejudice and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
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Finally, the court considered issues as to apportioning payment
between the appellant and the other defendant, who were held jointly
and severally liable. First, the other defendant's liability was reduced
by the amount guaranteed in his "Mary Carter" agreement. Then,
the appellant Was liable to the plaintiff for the full amount remaining. However, the other defendant, in settling pursuant to a
"Mary Carter" agreement, remained an active party and incurred
a joint judgment, Therefore, the other defendant remained liable to
the appellant for comparative contribution to a joint tort-feasor under the provisions of W. Va. Code § 55-7-13 (1931), the contribution
after judgment statute.
Catlett v. McQueen, 375 S.E.2d 184 (W. Va. 1988).
The appellant suffered severe injuries to his feet as a result of
an automobile accident. Following the accident, the appellant was
taken to the hospital emergency room and was treated by the appellee, an orthopedic surgeon. At trial, the defendant testified that
he wanted to amputate one of the appellant's injured feet to reduce
the possibility of infection. Although the appellant would not consent to the amputation of his foot, he did consent to the surgical
removal of three toes. Subsequent to the amputation of the toes,
the site of the amputation became infected and ultimately resulted
in the removal of the appellant's leg below the knee.
The appellant assigned as error the fact that the trial court refused to admit evidence consisting of pictures that showed the extent
of the injuries to his feet. The trial court refused to admit the pictures as evidence, ruling that the gruesome pictures would prejudice
the outcome of the trial if admitted. The Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's exclusion of the pictures. The court determined that
absent an abuse of discretion in admitting the pictorial evidence,
the trial court's decision in admitting the evidence was proper.
The appellant also assigned as error the trial court's jury instructions. The error involved a jury instruction requested by the
defendant concerning the appellant's consent to surgery. The Supreme Court held that if there is evidence lending support to a proposed instruction, then it should be permitted. Thus, the jury's verdict
should not be disturbed based on the rejected instructions if the
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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evidence supported the defendant's requested instructions. Furthermore, the court stated that each party is entitled to have his theory
of the case presented through instructions.
When read as a whole, the instructions could not have misled
the jury in holding for the defendant. Moreover, the instructions as
given provided ample opportunity for the jury to find for the plaintiff, which it declined to do. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit
court was affirmed.
VI.

FAmMy LAw

Vance v. Vance, 375 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1988).
At issue on appeal was the lower court's division of a couple's
assets pursuant to the equitable distribution statute, W. Va. Code
§ 48-2-32 (1986 Replacement Vol.). Mrs. Vance contended that the
lower court had erred in failing to divide equally between the parties
the assets of an ambulance business and two certificates of deposit
amounting to $40,000.
As to the ambulance service, at least part of the purchase price
was paid from earnings of the parties during the marriage. All property and earnings acquired during a marriage are marital assets. W.
Va. Code § 48-2-1(e) (1986 Replacement Vol.). In addition, both
parties took an active part in the operation of the business. Even
though Mr. Vance had purchased the ambulance service prior to
marriage, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that it was marital
property at the time of separation.
At one point the parties assumed joint ownership of the ambulance business and divided the corporate stock evenly between
them. Mrs. Vance later transferred her interest back to her husband,
but after the transfer she continued to work full-time in the ambulance service. When Mr. Vance was disabled due to injury, she
operated it alone for two years. After Mrs. Vance transferred her
interest back to her husband, the business was a marital asset. In
order for property that is transferred between spouses to be separate
property rather than marital property, there must be proof that it
was intended as an irrevocable gift. Roig v. Roig, 364 S.E.2d 794,
798 (W. Va. 1987). Mr. Vance did not meet the burden of proof
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to show that such a gift was intended, particularly in view of Mrs.
Vance's increased role in running the ambulance service after the
transfer. Therefore, the court held that Mrs. Vance was entitled to
equitable distribution of the property as a marital asset.
The Supreme Court of Appeals also held the certificates of deposit to be marital property. Even though they were titled to Mr.
Vance alone, he had accumulated the money to purchase them from
his earnings during the marriage. Mr. Vance contended that there
had been an informal agreement between the parties that the funds
were his separate property. However, an agreement between a husband and wife is unenforceable unless it is in writing. W. Va. Code
§ 48-3-9 (1986 Replacement Vol.).
The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the court below also
erred in failing to take into account the value of Mrs. Vance's noneconomic contributions when dividing the marital property. Although Mr. Vance had made a greater economic contribution to the
marriage than did Mrs. Vance, neither party had overcome the statutory presumption in favor of equal distribution of all marital assets
between them.
In re Kilpatrick, 375 S.E.2d 794 (W. Va. 1988).
This is a case of first impression in this jurisdiction. A couple
wishing to marry challenged the constitutionality of W. Va. Code
§ 48-1-6, which requires a standard serological test for syphilis in
order to obtain a marriage license. The appellants, citing a canon
of the Universal Life Church which prohibits the removal of blood
for testing, contended that the statute violates the free exercise clause
of the first amendment of the United States Constitution and a
similar provision of art. III, section 15 of the West Virginia Constitution.
Recognizing that a compelling state interest is necessary to justify
inhibiting first amendment freedoms, the Supreme Court of Appeals
held that the health interests of society, the health interests of prenuptial couples and the health interests of future children constitute
a compelling state interest. The required serological test is a minimally intrusive means of protecting those interests. Therefore, the
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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court held that the statute does not violate the free exercise clauses
of the federal and state constitutions.
In so holding, the court viewed as critical the distinction between
belief and conduct recognized by the United States Supreme Court
in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-4, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903,
84 L.Ed. 1213, 1218 (1940). The court went on to say that the free
exercise of religion may allow every person to hold his or her own
convictions, but it does not allow one to act on those convictions
to the detriment of compelling state interests.
Crone v. Crone, 375 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1988).
The appellee, who was on a two week military leave, was not
permitted to visit his child by his ex-wife, the appellant, who had
custody of the child. The appellee petitioned the Circuit Court of
Mineral County to clarify his visitation privileges. Without notice
to the appellant of the hearings, the circuit court granted the appellee
exclusive visitation privileges for a portion of his annual military
leave. The wife appealed the order of the circuit court, arguing that
her constitutional right to due process had been violated because
she was not present or represented at the hearing.
W. Va. Code § 48-2-15(e) vested the circuit courts of West Virginia with continuing jurisdiction to modify original divorce decrees
concerning alimony, custody and child support as required by the
altered circumstances of the parties and the needs of the children.
However, while the court did have jurisdiction to modify the decree,
the Supreme Court held that the circuit court violated both federal
and state constitutional guarantees of due process when it failed to
afford the former wife notice of the hearing to modify the father's
visitation rights.
Based on the circuit court's violation of the wife's due process,
the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court and
remanded the case for a new hearing on the issue of the father's
visitation rights.
VII.

LEGAL ETHIcs/PRFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY

Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W.Va. 1989).
The petitioner, an attorney practicing in Mingo County, brought
an action to prohibit the Circuit Court of Mingo County from apDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
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pointing him to any additional criminal cases. The petitioner demonstrated that in the year 1987, twenty-seven percent of his time
was devoted to court appointed cases. He claimed that because of
these appointments, he had to turn down paying clients and that
he could not provide effective assistance of counsel to court-appointed clients.
The court appointed a special master to hold hearings and hear
evidence concerning West Virginia's criminal appointment system.
After considering this evidence, the court found that inadequate rates
of pay and delays of as much as a year in payments of hourly rates
and of out-of-pocket expenses place an unconscionable burden on
the 24 percent of the bar who represent 92 percent of the appointed
caseload. The court also found that an inequitable share of that
burden falls more heavily upon rural lawyers and young lawyers,
However, the court upheld and firmly endorsed the long-standing
tradition that part of a lawyer's time be devoted to uncompensated
public service. The court ruled that this principle is reinforced by
the fact that lawyers are awarded substantial public benefits. The
court also specifically refused to require court-appointed lawyers to
be paid fair market rates. The court reached the conclusion, however, that equal protection and due process principles require some
upper limit on involuntary appointments.
The court ruled that it is an unjust taking of property without
just compensation to require lawyers to devote more than ten percent
of their work to involuntarily appointed cases. Even more seriously,
financial burdens upon lawyers created by inadequate rates of pay,
arbitrary maximums, long delays in receiving payment and the absence of any upper limit on the number of appointments may result
in a conflict of interest between lawyer and client that implicates
the client's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
Without some limit on required appointments, the court reasoned,
economic pressures could adversely affect the manner in which at
least some cases are conducted.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Appeals held, effective immediately: 1) that no lawyer in West Virginia may be required to
devote more than ten percent of his normal work year to court
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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appointed cases (the court's emphasis); 2) that lawyers from other
circuits may be appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants
and that their reasonable travel expenses are payable automatically,
above and beyond the $500 expense limit set forth in W. Va. Code
§ 29-21-14(e)(3). The court then held, effective July 1 1990: 1) that
no lawyer may be involuntarily appointed unless the hourly rate of
pay is $45 for out-of-court work and $65 for in-court work; 2) that
the legislature, in order to allow periodic compensation of lawyers
as services are performed, must create a mechanism allowing lawyers
to receive $1,500 cash advances for out-of-pocket expenses, subject
to approval by the circuit judge.
Committee on Legal Ethics v. CharlesE. Anderson, No. 18804 (Feb.
17, 1989).
Annulment of license - Retroactive annulment
The respondent, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State
of West Virginia, pleaded guilty in Federal District Court to two
felonies, obstruction of justice and subscribing to a false tax return.
In recommending that the respondent's license to practice law
be annulled, the Committee on Legal Ethics (hereinafter Committee)
asserted to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that the
convictions violated the Code of Professional Responsibility because
the acts: (1) involved moral turpitude, (2) were dishonest, and (3)
adversely reflected on the respondent's fitness to practice law.
The Supreme Court followed the recommendation of the Committee and held that the Committee had met their burden of proving,
by clear evidence, that the respondent was guilty of crimes involving
moral turpitude. Consequently, mandatory annulment of his license
to practice law was required under section 23, part E, article VI of
the By-Laws of the West Virginia State Bar.
The Supreme Court did permit the annulment of the respondent's
license to practice law to be retroactive to the date he closed his
law office, rather than the date of the final annulment order.
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Committee On Legal Ethics v. Coleman, 377 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va.
1988).
A complaint was filed against the respondent, an attorney, by
a former client he represented in a series of workers' compensation
hearings. The petitioner alleged that the attorney had charged him
a fee that was in excess of the statutory ceiling provided by W. Va.
Code § 23-5-5 (1975) (hereinafter 23-5-5).
The Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar
(hereinafter Committee) agreed with the petitioner and concluded
that the respondent did charge a higher fee than permissible. The
Committee recommended suspension of the respondent's license for
thirty days and that the respondent make restitution to the petitioner
for the amount of the fee over the statutory limit.
The issue raised in this case is the interpretation of 23-5-5, which
places a ceiling on an attorney's fee for Workers Compensation
awards by limiting the attorney fees to 20% of the award for a 208
week time period. The respondent argues that the 208 week statutory
time limitation applies only to future benefits. Therefore, he is entitled to 20% of the benefits accrued from the time of the client's
injury, in addition to 20% of the future benefits for a period of
208 weeks.
The Supreme Court interpreted 23-5-5 as limiting fees to a total
of 208 weeks for both accrued and future benefits. Thus, the Court
determined that the fees charged by the respondent were excessive.
Nonetheless, the court held that the respondent based his fee upon
a good faith interpretation of an ambiguous statute that was designed to place a ceiling on fees. Therefore, the respondent's fee
was not illegal or excessive under Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A), and
disciplinary action for an ethics violation was not appropriate where
there was a lack of intent to violate an ambiguous statute. However,
the Supreme Court did direct that the respondent pay restitution of
the portion of the fee that was above the statutory limit.
VIII.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT/PUBLIC OFICIALS

Scott v. Marion County Comm'n, 377 S.E.2d 476 (W. Va. 1988).
West Virginia Code § 7-17-12 (1984) provides that before a county
commission can impose a fire service fee upon the users of the servhttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10

26

Leydon
Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals Decisions, 1
CASE
DIGESTS
1990] and Wigal: Case Digests: West

ices, "ten percent of the qualified voters" must petition for such
a fee. In 1987, the Marion County Commission passed an ordinance
imposing a fire service fee on residents not served by city fire departments. Suit was filed to enjoin collection of the fee on the grounds
that ten percent of the registered voters in the county had not petitioned for it. Rather, the petitioner charged, only ten percent of
the voters in the areas to be affected had signed the petition. The
circuit court certified to the Supreme Court of Appeals the question
whether the phrase in the statute "ten percent of the qualified voters" means only the qualified voters of the affected area or the
qualified voters of the entire county.
The court held that the legislature intended the phrase to mean
ten percent of the voters who would pay the fee. The court reasoned
that it would make little sense to establish a procedure by which
voters who would neither receive the services nor pay the fee could
petition to force strangers to do so. Moreover, the court held, the
legislature specifically used the words "qualified voters of the county"
in a different provision of the same statute. The court reasoned that
this indicated the legislature did not intend the phrase "ten percent
of the qualified voters" to be interpreted to mean all the voters of
the entire county, unless it specifically included the phrase "of the
county."
In 1988, the legislature amended § 7-17-12 to define "qualified
voters" as meaning registered voters who reside in the affected fire
service district and are users or prospective users of the fire services
provided.
Jones v. West Virginia Bd. of HearingAid Dealers, No. 18633 (Dec.
15, 1988).
The petitioners had applied for licenses as hearing aid dealers
with the West Virginia Board of Hearing Aid Dealers (Board). The
Board refused to issue them licenses. In this mandamus proceeding,
the petitioners requested the court to require the Board to notify
them of their results on the hearing aid dealer examination in'accordance with W. Va. Code § 30-26-7 (1986), and to conduct a full
hearing on the Board's decision as required by W. Va. Code § 3026-16 (1986). After the petitioners filed this writ, the examination
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results were communicated to them and the hearing was scheduled.
As a result, the petition became moot.
The court reiterated its holding in Nelson v. Public Employees
Insurance Board, 300 S.E.2d 86 (W. Va. 1982) (syllabus point 4),
that "[w]here a public officer wilfully fails to obey the law, attorney's fees will be awarded." The court then held that the Board
had a statutory duty to notify the petitioners of the examination
results and to schedule a hearing. Because the Board had willfully
failed to perform these legal duties until after the petition was filed,
the petitioners were awarded their attorney's fees.
IX.

PROPERTY

In re Estate of Foster, 376 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1988).
The petitioners, co-administrators of the estate of Lena G. Harris, sought to separate her personal property and monies from the
estate of her alleged common law husband, William E. Foster.
West Virginia does not recognize common law marriage, but will
accord legal effect to marriages consummated in another state and
recognized as valid in that state. Harris and Foster cohabited for
a period of thirty years, first in the District of Columbia and then
in Virginia. The circuit court adopted the finding of the Fiduciary
Commissioner who ruled that, under the laws of the District of
Columbia, Harris and Foster were married by virtue of their cohabitation. As a result, the petitioners were not entitled to Harris'
assets because those assets had descended to William Foster as her
common law husband. On appeal the petitioners argued that the
existence of a common law marriage in the District of Columbia
requires an express agreement between the parties to be husband
and wife, and they contended that Harris and Foster never expressed
such an intention.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the weight
of the evidence supported the finding of a common law marriage
between Harris and Foster. While both of the parties were deceased,
District of Columbia case law holds that their intentions may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. Britton, 269 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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The Supreme Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the
court below, noted that when findings of fact by a commissioner
in chancery have been confirmed by a circuit court, they are entitled
to peculiar weight in the appellate court.
Adams v. Gaylock, 378 S.E.2d 297 (W. Va. 1989).
The appellants brought a civil action for breach of implied warranty of habitability and retaliatory eviction against their landlord,
the appellee. The Logan County Circuit Court directed a verdict for
the appellee after the appellants' case in chief.
The appellants rented a mobile home from the appellee that: (1)
lacked proper drainage from the bathroom and kitchen, (2) had
doors that would not shut, (3) had broken windows, and (4) had
an inoperable furnace. The appellants refused to pay further rent
until the appellee repaired the defective items. However, the appellee
evicted the appellants, allegedly in retaliation for their complaints
concerning the substandard living conditions.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's directed verdict
and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that
the appellants presented a prima facie case of breach of the warranty
of habitability and that a jury should have rendered a verdict after
hearing the facts of the case.
W. Va. Code
fit and habitual
ognized that the
iatory eviction,
procedure.

§ 37-6-30 imposed a duty on the landlord to provide
residential property. Additionally, the court recappellants are protected from the appellee's retaland are entitled to defend against an eviction

Lastly, the court addressed the issue of damages. It held that in
cases involving breach of the implied warranty of habitability, the
measure of damages is the difference between the fair market value
of the premise in habitable condition and the fair market value of
the premises in substandard condition. Therefore, the appellants
would be entitled to damages measured by the difference between
the rental price they paid for the premises and the fair market value
of the premises in their substandard condition.
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Blair v. Preece, 377 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1988).
The appellant appealed an adverse judgment of the Mingo County
Circuit Court in a case involving a boundary line dispute. The evidence showed that the two parcels of land in question had transferred ownership several times. During one transfer, an outconveyance allegedly consisting of the disputed property was made
by a prior owner of the appellee's property to a prior owner of the
appellant's property.
The appellant, proceeding pro se, presented evidence and testimony concerning the location of the boundary line. However, the
appellees had the property surveyed, and their surveyor testified that
the strip of land in question was owned by the appellees. The appellant contended that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
a survey map prepared by the appellee's surveyor to be admitted
into evidence. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the map to be entered into evidence
because it was both independent of and illustrative of the surveyor's
testimony.
In an alternative defense, the appellees argued that even if the
survey did not positively prove their ownership of the strip of the
land in question, they had title by adverse possession. The appellant
responded that the predecessor in interest of the appellant's property
had granted a life estate to the predecessor's husband and that the
creation of the life estate interrupted the running of the statute of
limitations for adverse possession. The Supreme Court, in holding
against the appellant, found that the law is clear, that once adverse
possession commences, the creation of a life estate will not interrupt
its running.
The appellant further alleged that adverse possession is barred
because the appellees failed to do a title search that would have
disclosed the appellant's ownership of the property prior to the appellee's purchase. The Supreme Court confirmed that the requirements for adverse possession do not require a title search when it
reiterated the five elements of adverse possession: (1) that the tract
be held adversely or hostilely, (2) that the possession has been actual,
(3) that the possession has been open and notorious, (4) that the
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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possession has been continuous, and (5) that the possession has been
under a claim or a color of title. In fact, a fundamental character
of adverse possession is an act that deprives a title owner of the
property.
The appellant claims the trial court erred in refusing to give
several of the jury instructions she submitted. However, the Supreme
Court determined that some of the instructions were not related to
the issues of the case, certain instructions contained language that
constituted binding instructions, and other instructions were unsupported by the evidence.
Lastly, the appellant argued that the trial court erred in refusing
to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. However, the Supreme Court held that although the evidence was conflicting, the
decision of the jury was supported by substantial evidence and unless
a preponderance of the evidence conflicts with the verdict, the verdict of a jury will stand.
First Nat'l Bank of Morgantown v. McGill, 377 S.E.2d 464 (W.

Va. 1988).
A testatrix made specific devises and bequests to the appellants
and left the residuary of her estate to other relatives. The appellants
contended that the testatrix intended her bequest to them to be tax
free, with the residuary estate paying the estate taxes.
The Monongalia County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the appellee, the executor of the estate. The circuit court
found that the only question presented is one of law; specifically,
whether it was the clear intent of the testatrix to pay the appellant's
inheritance taxes out of the residuary estate. The circuit court ruled
that the appellants were liable for the inheritance taxes because the
will, on its face, did not contain a clear charge that the residuary
estate was to pay the taxes.
The West Virginia inheritance tax, prior to its repeal in 1985
(subsequent to this action), was a tax on the beneficiary in proportion to the amount of the estate received. The beneficiary is
responsible for the tax unless the testator or testatrix clearly and
specifically expressed otherwise in the will. Cuppett v. Neilly, 143
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W. Va. 845, 105 S.E.2d 548 (1958), Consequently, the Supreme
Court held that the clause in the will which contained a general
direction to pay debts, expenses, taxes and other "stock" language
was not sufficient to shift estate tax liability to the residuary estate.
The Supreme Court determined that the true inquiry was not what
the testatrix meant to express in her will, but what the language
actually expressed. Affirmed.
Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 379 S.E.2d 388 (W. Va, 1989).

The appellee instituted an action against the 3 C Coal Co., alleging that the defendant's mining activity led to the desecration of
his relatives' graves. The alleged desecration resulted from subsidence of the ground under the cemetery, which was located above
a coal seam that was recently mined by the defendant, a contract
miner employed by co-defendant Consolidation Coal Company
(hereinafter Consol). The Wyoming County Circuit Court awarded
compensatory and punitive damages to the appellee for the defendant's damage to the cemetery.
The evidence showed that the appellee had noticed cracks suddenly appearing in the graveyard, The appellee and other witnesses
testified that the cracks were caused by subsidence of the ground
caused by underground mining activity. Consol acknowledged that
recent underground mining had taken place in the vicinity of the
cemetery. While admitting no liability for the damage, Consol filled
the cracks and holes with dirt and replanted grass seed.
The Supreme Court ruled that a cemetery lot is a perpetual easement, and that a human body is a species of property right. Therefore, relatives have a cause of action for damages when desecration
of a cemetery occurs. However, while the Supreme Court permitted
recovery of compensatory damages for mental distress, it overturned
the trial court's award of punitive damages. The Supreme Court
held that the evidence did not justify the award of punitive damages,
as there was no showing of a wilful, wanton, reckless, or malicious
act, one of which is required for an award of punitive damages.
Additionally, the court found error in the appellee's attorney disclosing the requested damage award in his opening and closing statements to the jury.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/10
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The judgment of the circuit court was set aside and the case
remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages.
Bane v. Whitman Land Resources, 376 S.E.2d 151 (W. Va. 1988).
The appellee brought this action in the Marshall County Circuit
Court to cancel an oil and gas lease. The trial court granted the
appellee's motion for a default judgment when the defendant, Whitman Land Resources, did not respond to service of process.
The default judgment against Whitman Land Resources was
challenged by Striker Oil & Gas Corp. (hereinafter Striker) and Discovery 1981 Private Drilling Program (hereinafter Discovery) under
Rule 19(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Striker
and Discovery moved the circuit court to set aside the default judgment against Whitman Land Resources because their interest in the
lease made them indispensable parties in the action to cancel the
lease. The appellants are appealing an adverse ruling on the motion
to set aside the default judgment against Whitman Land Resources.
The first question presented to the Supreme Court involved what
interest in the lease Whitman Land Resources received from its assignor, Whitman Oil & Gas Corporation. Whitman Land Resources
obtained the lease in question from Whitman Oil & Gas as a security
interest to collateralize a loan made to Whitman Oil & Gas. Subsequent to the transfer of the lease to Whitman Land Resources,
Whitman Oil & Gas transferred its remaining interest in the oil and
gas lease to Striker and Discovery.
The Supreme Court determined that although Whitman Oil &
Gas assigned the leases to Whitman Land Resources, it was merely
"an assignment to create a collateral security agreement." Thus,
Whitman Oil & Gas had valid ownership of the lease in question,
subject to the security interest of Whitman Land Resources, when
it assigned its remaining interest to Striker and Discovery. Therefore,
both Striker and Discovery had a valid interest in the lease which
was the subject of the default judgment in circuit court.
The court held that the appellants should have been parties to
the suit because they had a substantial ownership interest in the lease
that would be destroyed by the default judgment. The failure of the
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trial court to set aside the default judgment did not allow for an
equitable adjudication of Striker and Discovery's interest. For that
reason, the court reversed the decision of the circuit court and remanded the case to have the default judgment set aside.
Cabot Oil & Gas v. Pocahontas Land Corp., 376 S.E.2d 94 (W.
Va. 1988).
The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case involved
the contractual obligations of the successors in interest to the parties
of a mineral lease. Pocahontas Land Corporation (hereinafter Pocahontas), the appellee, was the successor in interest to the original
lessor; Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation of West Virginia (hereinafter
Cabot), the appellant, was the successor in interest to the original
lessee of the property.
Pocahontas sought a declaratory judgment in the McDowell
County Circuit Court to determine which of the parties had the
contractual obligation to relocate a gas line crossing the property
on which the parties had the respective leases of the coal and oil
mineral rights. The circuit court interpreted the original lease and
ruled that the plain and unambiguous language in the lease required
Cabot, successor in interest to the original lessee, to relocate the gas
line.
The Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the circuit court,
holding that the original lease was a valid instrument which expressed the intent of the parties with clarity and did not require
judicial interpretation. The court determined that the assignment of
the leases in question conveyed the same obligations to the assignees
that the original parties had. Therefore, Cabot, successor to the
original lessee of the gas rights, had the responsibility to relocate
the gas line.
Canei v. Culley, 374 S.E.2d 523 (W. Va. 1988).
The appellants brought the action to enjoin a neighboring landowner from denying them use of an easement across neighboring
property. The Hancock County Circuit Court denied the appellant's
request for the use of the easement and the court's decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
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For an easement by way of necessity to exist, the property requiring access must be landlocked with no other way of ingress/
egress. Because the appellants had access to their property by another road, the court determined that the appellants were not entitled
to a way of necessity across the neighboring land. Moreover, the
court held that the plaintiffs had not established their right to a
prescriptive easement because they could not show that they had
used the easement for the required ten years of continuous and uninterrupted use.
The appellants also claimed that a survey of the disputed easement established that the appellants owned the land on which the
easement was located. However, the appellant's surveyor had based
the survey on the appellants' oral statements concerning the location
of the boundary line, rather than existing survey monuments. The
court held that the survey was not conducted in conformity with
generally accepted survey practices and was invalid for the purpose
of proving ownership of the disputed easement.
Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had not erred
in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. A trial court sitting
in lieu of a jury will be afforded the same weight as a jury verdict
-- d the court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless the
evidence is clearly against the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court
was affirmed.
Robert V. Leydon
Gary S. Wigal
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